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Comments

Risky Business: Determining the Business
Necessity of Criminal Background Checks
Kelsey Sullivant

INTRODUCTION

Employers routinely run criminal background checks on
prospective applicants as part of their hiring process. A 2012
survey found that approximately two-thirds of organizations
conduct criminal background checks on all job candidates, and
86 percent of employers use criminal background checks.' For
certain occupations in some states, employers are required to
not hire potential employees with felony convictions. 2 The effect
of using these checks can be widespread, as an "estimated 65
million people in the United States have an arrest or conviction

t BA 2011, University of Florida; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1

SHRM Finds Fewer Employers Using Background Checks in Hiring (Society for

Human Resource Management July 19, 2012), online at http://www.shrm.org/about/
pressroom/PressReleases/Pages/BackgroundChecks.aspx (visited Oct 18, 2014) (noting
that the percentage of employers that conduct criminal background checks has decreased
as human resource professionals "loo[k] more closely at the job-relatedness of these
practices").
2 See, for example, Act 24 of 2011, 24 PS § 1-111 (requiring
by Pennsylvania law
background checks for all prospective employees of public and private schools).
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record that can show up on a routine criminal background
check." 3 As modern technology makes it easier for employers to
gain access to applicant's criminal histories, the way employers
use this information prompts several legal issues.
Criminal background checks can have a greater negative
impact on racial minorities than non-minorities. 4 Even when
criminal background checks are used for all applicants, they
may still have a disproportionate effect on racial minorities, as
racial minorities are more likely than white Americans to be
arrested as well as to be convicted.5 As a result of these
differences, racial minority groups may be disparately impacted
by criminal background checks used in hiring decisions. 6
In order to combat the perceived injustice of excluding
people with criminal records from employment, ten states and
many municipalities have enacted "ban-the-box" legislation.7
These laws work to limit background checks in a number of
ways. For example, they can force employers to only use

NAACP Lauds EEOC on Updated Criminal Background Check Policy (National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Apr 25, 2012), online
http: //www.naacp.org/press/entry/naacp-lauds-eeoc-on-updated-criminal-backgroundcheck-policy (visited Oct 18, 2014).
4

at

Robb Mandelbaum, US Push on Illegal Bias Against Hiring Those With Criminal

Records (NY Times June 20, 2012), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/
2 1/business/smallbusiness/us-presses-on-illegal-bias-against-hiring-those-with-criminalrecords.html?pagewanted= all (visited Oct 18, 2014).

Report of The Sentencing Project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee:
Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System *1 (The
Sentencing Project Aug 2013), online at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
rd ICCPR%20Race0% 20and%20Justice% 20Shadow% 20Report.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
See also US Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2011 *8 (Dec 2012), online at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014) (noting that in 2011,
blacks and Hispanics were imprisoned at higher rates than whites among all age groups
and for both male and female inmates).
6 See Roberto Concepci6n Jr, Need Not Apply: The Racial DisparateImpact of PreEmployment Criminal Background Checks, 19 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 231, 23839 (Spring 2012) (describing how a criminal record has a greater impact on black job
applicants than their white counterparts and noting that arrests appear on a criminal
background check).

See William Harless, 'Ban the Box' Laws Make CriminalPasts Off-Limits, (The
Wall Street Journal Aug 3, 2013), online at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323997004578640623464096406 (visited Oct 18, 2014). See also
Minn Stat § 181.53 (2013) (banning employers from using blanks or application forms
that ask for applicant's criminal history); Minn Stat § 364.021 (2013) (permitting an
employer to inquire into an applicant's criminal history only once the applicant has been
selected for an interview or a conditional offer of employment has been made).
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criminal records later in the hiring process, or to only consider
offenses from the past few years. 8
Even if in a jurisdiction without a "ban-the-box" law, an
employer's use of criminal background checks may in some cases
violate the law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual because
of the individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
An employer need not intentionally discriminate to violate the
law, as a policy even neutral on its face will violate Title VII if it
has a disparate impact on a protected group. A policy where an
employer uses the results of criminal background checks to
exclude applicants with criminal convictions could have a
disparate impact on minorities even if the policy is applied
equally across all applicants.
If a claimant can show a hiring policy had a disparate
impact on a group protected by Title VII, the burden then shifts
to the employer to show the policy is justified by business
necessity. Many court decisions that consider business necessity
analyze policies such as aptitude tests or physical requirements
where the requirement relates to job performance. 9 Applying
this same idea to criminal background checks can be difficult,
however, as they do not predict an employee's ability to perform
the job.
Few courts have examined what constitutes a business
necessity defense for an employer who uses criminal background
checks in a way that has a disparate impact on racial minorities.
The Eighth Circuit rejected overly broad bright-line policies that
exclude applicants automatically and proposed a three-factor
test. 10 On the other hand, the Third Circuit found that a policy
that determined acceptable risk could be acceptable even if it
was a bright-line rule. 11 Both of these decisions help construct

8

See Harless, 'Ban the Box' Laws Make CriminalPasts Off-Limits (cited in note 7).

9 See generally Albemarle Paper Co u Moody, 422 US 405 (1975) (declining to find

that two general ability tests were validated by job relatedness); Lanning u Southeastern
Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority, 181 F3d 478 (3d Cir 1999) (analyzing whether
an employer's requirement that applicants run 1.5 miles is consistent with business
necessity); Dothard u Rawlinson, 433 US 321 (1977) (rejecting that height and weight
requirements for a prison guard position are permissible on business necessity grounds).
10 See generally Green u Missouri Pacific RailroadCo, 523 F2d 1290 (8th Cir 1975).
" See generally El v Southeastern Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority, 479 F3d
232 (3d Cir 2007) ("SEPTA").
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an outline of the business necessity defense, but neither is
sufficient to make its application in courts predictable.
This Comment discusses the test courts should use to
determine if an employer's background-check policy is consistent
with business necessity. Part I provides background information
as to the formation of the business necessity defense. Part II
analyzes the different approaches courts have taken when
looking at business necessity in the criminal history context
specifically. Part III proposes that the risk analysis test should
be abandoned in favor of a more flexible assessment. This
Comment argues that courts may be better off in determining
this issue if they avoid analogizing the business necessity of
criminal background checks with other employment policies that
relate more closely with job performance. Instead, courts should
adopt the three-factor test proposed by the Eighth Circuit and
consider whether the policy accurately reflects the type of
conviction, the job sought, and the time since the conviction.
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW ON CRIMINAL BACKGROUNDS AND
DISPARATE IMPACT

Only two circuit courts have analyzed this legal issue. Both
the Eighth Circuit and the Third Circuit have determined that
criminal background checks may violate Title VII if they have a
disparate impact on minority groups, but these courts
approached the analysis in different ways. The Eighth Circuit
maintained that exclusionary criminal history policies with
bright-line rules are not justified by business necessity and
created a three-factor test. 12 Conversely, the Third Circuit
utilized an approach based on risk analysis. 13 Prior to discussing
the merits of either approach, it is useful to understand the
origins of disparate impact claims and the business necessity
defense.
A.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire an individual "because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."14
12

See Green, 523 F2d at 1297.

s See SEPTA, 479 F3d at 232.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified at 42 USC

14
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An employer does not need to intentionally discriminate in order
to be subject to liability under Title VII. 15 In order for a plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he or she "must
show that the facially neutral employment practice had a
significantly discriminatory impact." 16 If the plaintiff is able to
do so, the burden shifts to the employer who must "justify the
employment practice or test as a business necessity."17 If the
employer demonstrates a relationship between the practice and
job performance, then a plaintiff can still be successful in a
lawsuit if he or she can show there is an alternative employment
practice that "serves the employer's legitimate goals as
effectively as the challenged practice" and "results in less of a
disparate impact."1 8 To better understand how an employer may
meet its burden of business necessity, it is helpful to look at how
the disparate impact claim and the business necessity defense
evolved over time.
B.

Formation of the Disparate Impact Claim under Title VII

The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to allow a
disparate impact cause of action.19 The Court's decision in these
cases created the structure for such a claim and formed the
requirements of a business necessity defense. Ultimately,
Congress chose to codify this construction in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.20
1.

Griggs: the Court first recognizes disparate impact
claims.

In Griggs v Duke Power Co, 2 1 the Supreme Court first
recognized that plaintiffs have a viable discrimination claim
without proving an employer's intent. 22 The employer in Griggs
required applicants to have a high school education and to pass
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
13

See generally Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971).

16 Connecticut v Teal, 457 US 440, 446 (1982).
17

Green, 523 F2d at 1293.

18

SEPTA, 479 F3d at 248-49.

See generally Griggs, 401 US 424; Albemarle Paper Co, 422 US 405.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071-1100, codified as
amended 42 USC § 1981 et seq.
21 401 US 424
(1971).
22 See generally Griggs,
401 US 424.
19
20
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two aptitude tests in order to be placed in most of the company's
departments. 23 Evidence showed that employees who had not
completed high school or passed the tests performed
satisfactorily for those positions. 24 Additionally, there was no
"meaningful study of [the requirements'] relationship to jobperformance ability." 2 5 The Court held that this demonstrates
"the inadequacy of broad and general testing devices" as
"[h]istory is filled with examples of men and women who
rendered highly effective performance without the conventional
badges of accomplishment." 2 6
Although the tests used did not reflect success on the job,
the company appeared to lack discriminatory intent for the
policy. 2 7 Regardless, the Court found that "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability." 2 8 An employer does not need to intend to
discriminate through the use of a policy or practice in order to
violate Title VII. Congress, the Court asserted, "directed the
thrust of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964] to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." 29 Title VII
then "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 30
Congress requires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." 31 Therefore, under Title VII
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." 32

23

Id at 427-28.

24

Id at 431-32.
Id at 431.
Griggs, 401 US at 433
Id at 432.
Id.
Id.

21

26
27
28
29

'o Griggs, 401 US at 431.

s1 Id.
32

Id at 430.
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The Griggs Court did not prohibit all employment practices
that have a discriminatory impact, explaining that the
"touchstone is business necessity." 33 As a result, employers may
be allowed to maintain practices with discriminatory results
under certain circumstances. The Court determined that such
employment practice must "bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it [is] used."34 An
employer has the burden then to show that the policy in
question has a "manifest relationship to the employment in
question." 35
2.

Albemarle: determining business necessity.

In Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 36 the Court considered
whether an employer's practice of using two general ability tests
was consistent with business necessity and job related. 37 In
determining whether Albemarle's tests met these requirements,
the Court considered the paper plant's operation and the testing
program's history. 38 Albemarle did not validate the tests for job
relatedness and set a seemingly random score cut-off point for
job applicants. 39 The Court set the standard for professional
validation studies used to show if an employment test is jobrelated, stating "discriminatory tests are impermissible unless
shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of
or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for
which candidates are being evaluated."' 40 Because the tests in
question did not fulfill this requirement, they did not meet the
defendant's burden for showing business necessity.4 1

"

1

Id at 431.
Griggs, 401 US at 431.
Id at 432.
422 US 405 (1975).
Albemarle, 422 US at 427.

38

Id.

39

Id at 428.
Id at 431.
Albemarle, 422 US at 431-36.

34

"

40
41
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Dothard:validating a policy.

After Albemarle helped to specify what employers must
show in order to prove business necessity, the Supreme Court
further clarified its position in Dothard v Rawlinson.42 The
Court considered the Alabama Board of Corrections'
requirement, as dictated by an Alabama statute, for correctional
counselors to meet a minimum 120-pound weight requirement
and a height minimum of five feet two inches. 43 The Court found
that these requirements had a discriminatory impact on female
applicants and then moved to consider if the neutral policy was
justified by a business necessity.44 Appellants asserted that the
height and weight requirements related to strength but offered
no evidence correlating the requirements with the amount of
strength needed for good job performance.4 5 Although the Court
rejected the appellant's argument, it noted that the employer
could meet the business necessity requirement by "adopting and
validating a test for applicants that measures strength
directly."4 6 In doing so, the Court further shaped the business
necessity defense to require employers to demonstrate that the
policy is correlated to a quality that is essential to efficient job
performance through actual empirical evidence and not just
imprecise reasoning.
The aforementioned cases help illustrate what courts need
in order to accept an employer's business necessity justification
for a policy. In analyzing an employer's argument, the Court
"refused to accept bare or 'common-sense'-based assertions of
business necessity and instead required some level of empirical
proof that challenged hiring criteria accurately predicted job
performance."4 7 When using policies that have a disparate
impact on a protected group, the employer may need to have
solid empirical evidence that the policy is related to job
performance.4 8 This creates a heavy burden for employers to
42

433 US 321 (1977).

43

45

Id at 324.
Id at 331.
Id.

46

Dothard,433 US at 332.

44

SEPTA, 479 F3d at 240.
See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the
DisparateImpact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 NC L Rev 1479, 1488
(1996) (noting that the Griggs reliance on the Equal Employment Opportunity
47

48
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justify a business policy that has a disparate impact on a
protected group. 9
C.

Methods of Validation

The standard of validation for a business policy has
fluctuated over time, but three main methods have gained
acceptance. The Court in Albemarle endorsed criterion
validation as a principal means of showing business necessity.SO
Criterion validation "requires the defendant to establish a
statistically significant correlation between good performance on
a test and good performance on the job according to some
accepted criterion."5 1 An employer may also use content
validation, in which "a test is validated by showing that it
directly incorporates the most significant and concrete parts of
the job for which it is used." 52 A third method is construct
validation. Construct validation focuses on certain mental
abilities or skills that are seen as important for future
performance. 53 An employer can validate a test by showing that
it measures an abstract ability, and then establishing that the
abstract ability is correlated with good job performance.5 4

Commission's Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures and the Court's
statement that the employer's defense failed as the job requirements were adopted
without a meaningful study of their relationship to job performance suggests that the
Court "intended to require employers to submit empirical validation of their job
requirements").
49 See id at 1490 ("By closely scrutinizing the company's validation study under the
rigorous standards established by the EEOC Guidelines, the [Albemarle] Court signaled
that employers would have to undertake an expensive, difficult validation study in order
to justify employment practices with a disparate impact.").
'o See George Rutherglen, DisparateImpact Under Title V11 An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 Va L Rev 1297, 1317-18 (1987) (noting that the Court in Albemarle
endorsed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines with great
deference before later applying a weaker standard).
51 Id at 1317 (commenting that an employer could, for example, demonstrate
criterion validation with speed or error rates or supervisor evaluations).
52 Id at 1318 (illustrating that a standard example of a content valid test is a typing
test for a typist position).
" Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv L
Rev 945, 1019 (1982) ("A third generally recognized technique is construct validation,
which focuses on the measurement of certain mental and other capacities-'constructs'deemed important to future performance.").
54 Rutherglen, 73 Va L Rev at 1324 (cited in note 50) (illustrating that an employer
could show a test measures an abstract ability such as intelligence and then establish,
"ideally by statistical evidence," that intelligence is correlated with good performance on
the job).

510
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Similarly, courts appear to support the idea that a business
policy should set only a minimum burden for applicants to be
qualified. Employers are not allowed to rely on a "more is better"
justification to allow criteria higher than what is actually
necessary for the job. 55 The Third Circuit has interpreted this to
mean that Title VII does not permit discriminatory cutoff scores
unless that score reflects the minimum qualifications necessary
to perform the job successfully. 5 6 This better reflects the
rationale for allowing disparate impact claims, as it aims to
protect individuals from discrimination by "eliminating
unnecessarybarriers to employment opportunities."57 Otherwise,
an employer could, for example, accept only job applicants with
the top scores even if doing so had a disparate impact on a
protected group, when applicants with lower scores would still
be able to fulfill all the job requirements.5 8
The Third Circuit buttressed its rejection of cutoff scores
and the "more is better" justification.5 9 As a result, an employer
must not only have empirical research to show that the policy
reflects business necessity but also show that the policy is a
measure of minimum qualifications for successful job
performance. This minimum qualification does not have to be
unreasonably low such that there is only a small percentage of
likely success on the job. 6 0 Instead, it must be shown only that
the qualification required is an actual business necessity and
not merely a business preference.
Court decisions imply that employers must meet a high
burden in order to show a policy is justified by business

" SEPTA, 479 F3d at 240 (noting that the employer cannot rely on an "abstract
notion that more of a given quality is better").
5
See Lanning, 181 F3d at 489.
1
Id (noting that only requiring employers to show that a cutoff score measures
minimum qualifications necessary for successful job performance will eliminate the use
of excessive cutoff scores that serve as an unnecessary barrier to employment resulting
in a disparate impact on minorities).
"' See, for example, Allan G. King and Rod M. Fliegel, Conviction Records and
Disparate Impact, 26 ABA J Labor & Empl L 405, 422 (2011) (noting that the Court
rejected employers' arguments that one would "naturally prefer smarter or stronger
employees to less intelligent or weaker ones, and so it was of no moment that the criteria
might be set a bit higher than strictly necessary" in Griggs,Albemarle, and Dothard).
59 Lanning, 181 F3d at 490 ("A business necessity standard that wholly defers to an
employer's judgment as to what is desirable in an employee therefore is completely
inadequate in combating covert discrimination based upon societal prejudices.").
60 See Griggs, 401 US at 436 ("Congress has not commanded that the less
qualified
be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins.").
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necessity. An employer must provide more than a common-sense
justification for a policy. Additionally, the qualification required
must be a true minimum for successful job performance,
meaning the criteria used "measure[s] the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract." 6 1
D.

Codification of Disparate Impact in the Civil Rights Act of
1991

In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This
amended five statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.62 Prior to the 1991 Act, the Supreme Court was in "a
period of restriction, retrenchment, and restoration of
traditional managerial prerogatives." 63 The effect of the Court's
decisions leading up to the Act limited the scope of civil rights
statutes and provided a narrow interpretation of those laws. 64
The Supreme Court drastically altered the business
necessity defense as well. In a 1989 decision, Wards Cove
Packing Co v Atonio, 65 the Court expanded the business
necessity defense. 66 While acknowledging it was departing from
previous decisions, the Court held that an employer's challenged
practice need not be "'essential' or 'indispensable' to the
employer's business" for it to not violate Title VII.67 Instead, "the
dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer." 68 Going further, the Court also shifted the burden

61

Id at 436.

62

See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement,

23 Stetson L Rev 53, 54 (1993) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Act of
1976).
6' Harold S. Lewis Jr, Walking the Walk of Plain Text: The Supreme Court's
Markedly More Solicitous Treatment of Title VII Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

49 SLU L J 1081, 1081-82 (2005) (describing the trend the Supreme Court took prior to
Congress' passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
64 See Leigh Anne Gilbert Hodge, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative
Response to the Supreme Court's Weakening of Civil Rights Remedies in the Workplace,

22 Cumb L Rev 801, 822-23 (1991-1992).
6
490 US 642 (1989).
6
See generally Wards Cove Packing Co, 490 US 642.
6
Id at 659 (noting that such a degree of scrutiny would "be almost impossible for
most employers to meet").
68
Id.

512
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from the employer to the plaintiff. The employer still would have
the burden of production in order to establish a business
necessity, however, the plaintiff would have the burden of
persuasion as he or she must prove denial of an employment
opportunity based on a protected group. 69 This decision resulted
in a more difficult path for plaintiffs in disparate impact claims.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "enacted into law as a
direct response to the Court's [recent decisions that]
substantially undermined enforcement of civil rights laws."7 0 In
the Act, Congress codified the disparate impact cause of action
outlined in Griggs that prohibited "practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent . . . if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior

discriminatory employment practices." 7 1 In doing so, Congress
rolled back the strict interpretations from the contemporary
Court and established a disparate cause of action more friendly
to plaintiffs than the Wards Cove rule.
The Act essentially codified the disparate impact claims and
business necessity defense recognized in Griggs. It follows from
the relevant statutes that an employment practice is unlawful
when a particular employment practice "causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin" and the respondent "fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity." 72 Despite codifying the
standard presented in Griggs, the legislative history does not
specify a precise definition of business necessity. 7 3 As a result,
courts are left to interpret what it means for a policy to be
consistent with business necessity.
Despite employers having multiple routes available in the
form of criterion, content, and construct validation to show a
policy is required by business necessity, these methods do not
necessarily make hiring and promotion decisions easy for
employers. For example, while an employer may be able to
69
See id at 659-60 (explaining that the persuasion burden remains with the
plaintiff for all prongs of a disparate impact claim).
70 Hodge, 22 Cumb L Rev at 823
(cited in note 64).

Griggs, 401 US at 430.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1074, codified as amended
42 USC § 2000e-2(k).
7
SEPTA, 479 F3d at 241-42 (noting "[m]embers of Congress simply could not
agree on a precise definition of business necessity").
7

72

RISKY BUSINESS

501]

513

provide empirical data showing a testing qualification relates to
a low-skilled job, upper-level employment systems put more
emphasis on prior experience and educational accomplishments,
and employment decisions are more subjective. 7 4 This shows
that the legal structures available to show business necessity
may not perfectly mirror the decision-making process of
employers.
II. BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE AND CRIMINAL
HISTORY
There exists relatively little guidance on how criminal
background checks relate to the business necessity defense. In
navigating this legal issue, it is useful to consider the relevant
appellate cases, the relevant district court cases, and the
interpretation from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
A.

Appellate Cases

There are few disparate impact decisions in which the policy
in question involves the employer use of criminal history in
making hiring decisions. Only two appellate courts have
considered this issue so far. 75 Although the precedent on this
topic is limited, the existing case law does construct some
guidelines for how an employer could show that using criminal
history in employment decisions is justified by business
necessity. Although decided several decades apart, Green v

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co7 6 and El v Southeastern
Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority 77 ("SEPTA") offer some
direction as to how courts can analyze this issue.
1.

The Eighth Circuit: Green v Missouri Pacific Railroad

Co.
In Green v Missouri Pacific Railroad Co, the Eighth Circuit
became the first appellate

court to consider

whether

an

74 Bartholet, 95 Harv L Rev at 955 (cited in note 53) (describing the difficulty in
applying job relatedness requirement from Griggs and its progeny for upper-level hiring
decisions).
7
See generally, Green, 523 F2d 1290; SEPTA, 479 F3d 232.
7
523 F2d 1290 (8th Cir 1975).
7
479 F3d 232 (3d Cir 2007).

514
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employer's use of criminal history in hiring decisions could be
justified by business necessity. The policy in question forwent
consideration of any applicant for employment who had been
convicted of any crime other than a minor traffic offense.78 The
plaintiff applied to be a clerk in the company's personnel office
but was informed he was not qualified because of his conviction
for refusing military induction, for which he had served twentyone months in prison.79 The plaintiff then sued the company,
alleging that the policy of not hiring any person with a criminal
conviction has a discriminatory effect based on race in violation
of Title VII, and that the policy is not justified by any business
necessity. 80 In determining if there was a disproportionate racial
impact, the court considered expert witness testimony
concluding that a black person is between 2.2 and 6.7 times as
likely as a white person to have a criminal conviction and that
the company's policy resulted in "53 of every 1,000 black
applicants but only 22 of every 1,000 white applicants" being
excluded from the hiring pool. 8 1 This established a prima facie
case of discrimination, and so the court then considered whether
the policy was justified by business necessity.
The company defended its practice, claiming the policy was
needed for a number of reasons including the fear of theft,
possible liability for hiring someone with known violent
tendencies, recidivism rates for convicts, and lack of moral
character of convicts. 82 An employer must support its business
necessity defense for a policy rejecting individuals with criminal
backgrounds with validating empirical evidence. 83 The court
rejected "a sweeping disqualification for employment resting
solely on past behavior" if it has a disproportionate racial impact
and "rests upon a tenuous or insubstantial basis."8 4 The court
rejected seemingly common-sense assertions, in favor of
requiring empirical evidence for the policy. As a result, an
employer cannot defend a policy like this by merely claiming

78 Green, 523 F2d at 1292.
79

Id at 1292-93.

80

Id at 1293.
Id at 1294-95.
Green, 523 F2d at 1298.

81
82

83 Id at 1298 (noting that the company's reasons for its policy can serve as relevant
considerations, but "in no way justify an absolute policy which sweeps so broadly").
84 Id at
1296.
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safety concerns without proof validating the policy. The court
based its decision in part on the company's own witness
testimony admitting that "not every ex-offender will be a poor
employee" and that it would be better for a company to consider
ex-offenders individually.8 5 The court also noted that policies
that reject ex-offenders heighten recidivism for convicts, opening
the door for a public policy argument against such hiring
practices.8 6
Green's perhaps most meaningful contribution to the issue
of criminal background use in hiring was its creation of factors
that "provide the starting point for analyzing how specific
criminal conduct may be linked to particular positions."8 7 The
court names three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the
offense or conduct; (2) the time that has passed since the offense,
conduct, and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) the nature of
the job held or sought.88
Ultimately, the court found that there was no business
necessity for the policy. 8 9 This is because the policy was too
broad, as it rejected all applicants convicted of any offense
except minor traffic offenses, placing those individuals "in the
permanent ranks of the unemployed."9 0 The court also appeared
sympathetic to criminal offenses from the individual's distant
past. 91 While it remains unclear what constitutes a proper
business necessity defense for a policy rejecting applicants with
criminal backgrounds, the Eighth Circuit appears to dismiss
bright-line policies that cover a wide variety of offenses and do
not take into account the amount of time that has passed since
the offense. The court in Green did not analyze the job itself to
determine if hiring an ex-convict for the position could be
particularly risky.

"' Id

at 1298.

"1 Green, 523 F2d at 1298.
87 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Consideration of Arrest and
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964
(Apr 25,
2012),
online
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest
conviction.cfm#VB 2 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
88 Id.
89

Green, 523 F2d at 1298.

90 Id.
91 Id ("To deny job opportunities to these individuals because of some conduct which
may be remote in time . . . is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.").
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The Third Circuit: El v SoutheasternPennsylvania

TransportationAuthority.
Over thirty years passed before another appellate court, the
Third Circuit, decided a case similar to Green regarding
applicants' criminal history. In SEPTA, the court considered an
employer policy that disallowed hiring anyone with a violent
criminal
conviction. 92 King Paratransit
Services,
Inc.
subcontracted to provide paratransit services. King hired El on
the condition he successfully completed a criminal background
check. 93 The background check revealed that El had a fortyseven year old conviction for second-degree murder, for which El
served more than three years in prison.9 4 Pursuant to the hiring
policy, King terminated his employment, giving the murder
conviction as its sole reason. 95 El asserted the policy violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating on the
basis of race as African Americans and Hispanics are more
likely to have a criminal record and be excluded by the policy. 96
In determining the business necessity of the policy, the
court relied on previous disparate impact cases, while
acknowledging that "[t]he Supreme Court has never dealt
directly with criminal record policies." 97 Still, the court pulled
essential lessons from these cases. First, previous decisions
"refused to accept bare or 'common-sense'-based assertions of
business necessity and instead required some level of empirical
proof that challenged hiring criteria accurately predicted job
performance."9 8 The takeaway from this, the court asserted, is
that employers must tailor policies to measure employmentrelated qualities "accurately and directly for each applicant."9 9
Second, the court noted that Supreme Court precedent does
not permit employers to justify policies that are more

SEPTA, 479 F3d at 235.
93 Id.
94 Id at 235-36.
95 Id at 235.
96 SEPTA, 479 F3d at 236-37.
97 Id at 240 (discussing court opinions that cover disparate impact claims such as
Griggs, Albemarle Paper Co, and Dothard).
98 Id (noting in particular Dothard, which rejected hiring criteria that roughly
measured strength despite the common-sense argument that prison guards must be
strong).
99 Id.
92
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exclusionary than strictly necessary because one would prefer
the more qualified employees. 100 This fits the intent of Congress
as well, as Congress "call[ed] the test 'business necessity,' not
'business convenience' or some other weaker term."10 1 While the
court emphasized that a policy has a higher burden than being
merely convenient, it lamented the lack of true definition of
"business necessity." 1 02
Thus, the court concluded that an employer policy must be
tailored accurately and directly for the job, and that the policy
cannot measure for anything higher than what is strictly
necessary. The level of tailoring and the method for determining
what is strictly necessary still remained an issue. In answering
this question, the court found that "hiring policies need not be
perfectly tailored to be consistent with business necessity." 103
The employer does not need to have a standard so low that they
hire an applicant with a low probability of successful job
performance. 104 As a whole, the court determined that employers
must show that a policy "accurately-but not perfectlyascertains an applicant's ability to perform successfully" and
that Title VII permits employers to "hire the applicant most
likely to perform the job successfully over others less likely to do
SO." 105

Immediately after determining the standards of business
necessity outlined from previous disparate impact cases, the
Third Circuit decreed that "[p]rior decisions on business
necessity do not directly control here."1 06 The standard for
business necessity, "minimum qualifications necessary for
successful performance of the job in question," does not fit for
'oo

SEPTA, 479 F3d at 240.
Id at 242.
102 Id at 241-42 (noting the Griggs and similar cases
"did not provide a precise
definition of business necessity" and that the members of Congress who created the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 could not agree on a precise definition either). See also Spiropoulos,
74 NC L Rev at 1521 (cited in note 48) ("No one could argue with a straight face that the
[Civil Right Act of 1991's] definition of business necessity is unambiguous. Indeed, it was
the very ambiguity of the language that made compromise possible.").
'os SEPTA, 479 F3d at 242 (explaining that Title VII does not require an employer to
accept a less qualified applicant in the name of non-discrimination).
104 Id at 242, citing Lanning, 308 F3d at 292 ("It would clearly be unreasonable to
require SEPTA applicants to score so highly on the run test that their predicted rate of
bob] success be 100%. It is perfectly reasonable, however, to demand a chance of success
that is better than 5% to 20%.").
1'0

10

SEPTA, 479 F3d at 242.

106

Id.
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criminal history cases as "'successful performance of the job' in
the usual sense is not at issue."10 7 The hiring policy in SEPTA
did not measure the ability of the employee to drive a
paratransit bus. 108
After finding no authority directly on point, the court
transformed the language used for business necessity to better
fit criminal history policies. 109 Criminal history policies and
performance -related policies both "ultimately concern the
management of risk." 110 Similar to how a performance policy
would not have to be perfectly tailored, the criminal history
policy must only accurately distinguish "between applicants that
pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that do not."1 11
Thus, the court subtly shifted the conversation on business
necessity from analyzing if the policy predicts job performance to
whether the policy can accurately determine the risk level of
hiring an applicant.
Furthermore, SEPTA distinguished itself from Green in two
respects. First, the paratransit position required an employee to
be alone with vulnerable members of society, which increased
public safety concerns. 112 This meant that the acceptable level of
risk for this position would be lower than for other jobs without
such concerns. Second, the court noted the policy in Green was a
bright-line rule that broadly rejected applicants with criminal
backgrounds. The policy in SEPTA, on the other hand, was more
tailored, only preventing consideration for applicants with the
"highest and most unpredictable rates of recidivism" who posed
the greatest danger to customers. 113 These differences made the
bright-line rule more acceptable to the court.
The court found that if someone with a violent conviction
has a "materially higher risk" than someone without, then the
policy to no longer consider hiring that person is justified.114 In
107 Id at 243 (remarking that successful performance
of the job could include not
attacking customers).
10
Id at 242-43.
109 SEPTA, 479 F3d at 244 (noting that standards from other discriminatory hiring
policy cases can be "adapted to fit the context of criminal conviction policies").
n0 Id (commenting that standards from other disparate impact cases can be applied
as both kinds of policies deal with managing risk).
n. Id at 245.
112 Id at 243 (noting that the position in Green was at corporate headquarters).
ns SEPTA, 479 F3d at 243.
114 Id at
245.
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defending a policy, an employer can justify it by showing
factors-such as age at the time of conviction or the number of
offenses-fail to reduce the risk to an "acceptable level." 115 On
the other hand, if a plaintiff is able to show, for example, that a
former criminal is not more likely to recidivate than an average
person, then the amount of risk could be reduced to that
acceptable level. 116

Thus, SEPTA upheld the contention in Green that brightline, overly broad policies can violate Title VII, while allowing
what the court considers a narrower and more job-related policy
that determines acceptable risk to stand. 117 This does not mean
that any bright-line policy would be unacceptable. The court
noted, "If a bright-line policy can distinguish between individual
applicants that do and do not pose an unacceptable level of risk,
then such a policy is consistent with business necessity." 118 The
bright-line policy utilized by SEPTA, for example, is an
acceptable policy because it is able to distinguish applicants
based on risk.
3.

Comparison of Green and SEPTA.

Although SEPTA and Green are arguably consistent with
one another, the courts used different means to analyze the
employer policies. In Green, the court did not consider the
position at issue to require special hiring criteria, whereas in
SEPTA, the court gave weight to the nature of the position and
the vulnerable members of society that would be affected by the
hiring decisions. 119 The court in SEPTA considered if the policy
distinguished applicants based on level of risk, but the Green
court did not discuss risk levels. Green and SEPTA both reject
over-inclusive bright-line rules, but SEPTA more clearly noted
that a tailored bright-line rule could be permissible. The SEPTA
court, unlike the Green court, described factors that an employer

Id at 246.
n1 Id at 247 (noting that there would be a factual question left for the jury to resolve
if an expert testified that a former criminal would not be more likely to recidivate).
117 SEPTA, 479 F3d at 243 (distinguishing the narrower
policy of the defendant from
11.

the "extremely broad exclusionary policy that fails to offer any empirical justification" in
Green).
11
Id at 245.
19
See id at 243 (noting that the position in Green was at corporate headquarters
while a paratransit driver had more access to the public).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

520

[2014

can use to show an unacceptable level of risk, such as age at the
time of conviction and the number of convictions. 1 20
B.

District Court Interpretations

In Waldon v Cincinnati Public Schools, 121 the defendant
asserted business necessity for its policy following a state law
that required criminal background checks of all employees and
termination of any employee with a conviction of certain
specified crimes. 122 The court reconciled the risk analysis of
SEPTA with the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Green.12 3 The court
noted that the policy would be acceptable if applied to "serious
recent crimes" because of the employees' proximity to
children. 124 The court considered risk, similar to the analysis
used in SEPTA. It determined that because the offenses were
remote in time and insubstantial and the plaintiffs had
demonstrated years of good performance, there was "no obvious
risk" due to past convictions. 125 The court in Waldon considered
the Green factors in a manner to analyze the risk to an employer
for hiring them.
The court in Ahmed v Kmart1 26 followed the SEPTA
analysis. The employment policy in question provided that the
business would not hire individuals who had been convicted of
violent crimes or theft crimes in the past seven years. 127
Although the court did not rely on whether the policy was
justified under business necessity after finding the plaintiff did
not advance a prima facie case of discrimination, the court
mentions that a business necessity defense could apply to the
employer's policy "since it appears to distinguish between
applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that
do not." 12 8 The court merely found that there could possibly be a
business necessity for the policy, and so it is unclear what kind

120

121
122
123

Id at 246.
941 F Supp 2d 884 (SD Ohio 2013).
Waldon, 941 F Supp 2d at 886.
Id at 889 ("The Court finds instructive the analysis of the Eighth Circuit in

[Green].").
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
2008 WL 4683440 (ED Mich).
Id at *1.
Id at *4 n 1.
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of empirical evidence of job relatedness the court may have
required had it completed a full analysis. Although the court
considered the level of risk, that does not show that it would not
have considered the Green factors as well if it were to go through
a business necessity analysis. The employment policy considered
the nature of the offense and the time elapsed since the conduct.
Therefore, the court may have used those factors in determining
the risk level.
C.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidance

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as an agency with the power
to issue procedural rules. 129 The courts in Green and SEPTA
both analyze the EEOC interpretation of Title VII, and so it is
helpful to look at how the agency has interpreted the Act
regarding criminal backgrounds. In 2012, the EEOC issued
updated guidelines regarding the use of arrest or conviction
records in employment decisions under Title VII. The EEOC
suggests that excluding an individual based on an arrest alone
rather than the conduct underlying the arrest would not be
consistent with business necessity, as an arrest does not
establish that criminal conduct has actually occurred. 130 The
guidance notes that a criminal conviction offers more support
that criminal conduct has occurred, but the EEOC still
recommends that employers not ask about convictions on job
applications. 131
The EEOC guidance names two circumstances under which
an employer policy of using criminal history will be consistent
with business necessity under Title VII. First, the employer can
"validat[e] the criminal conduct screen for the position in
question per the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures (Uniform Guidelines) standards (if data about
criminal conduct as related to subsequent work performance is
available and such validation is possible)." 132 The second
circumstance in which an employer will consistently show
129

42

USC § 2000e-12(a).

"s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Consideration of Arrest and
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (cited in note 87).
1 Id.
132 Id.
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business necessity is if the policy "consider[s] at least the nature
of the crime, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job (the
three Green factors), and then provides an opportunity for an
individualized assessment for people excluded by the screen." 133
An employer still may be able to justify excluding applicants
based solely on the three Green factors as long as the policy is
narrowly tailored to identify conduct with a tight connection to
the position. 134
The EEOC recommends employers make an individualized
assessment of applicants that provides the applicant an
opportunity to demonstrate the exclusionary policy does not
properly apply to him or her. 135 In its guidance, the EEOC lists
several factors it deems relevant for an employer to consider,
including the facts surrounding the offense, rehabilitation
efforts, the number of offenses, and evidence that the applicant
performed similar work after being convicted with no criminal
incidents in their employment. 136 In sum, the EEOC
recommends that employers stay away from bright-line policies
that could prevent the employer from showing business
necessity, and instead try to tailor the policy to the job at hand
and offer an individualized assessment for individuals excluded
by the policy.
Guidelines from the EEOC clearly endorse the Green
factors, as well as encourage employers to use a more
individualized assessment for hiring. It, however, is unclear
what level of deference the EEOC guidance should be given.
Earlier disparate impact cases have entitled the EEOC's
Guidelines to great deference, 137 while more recent cases have
only given the guidance deference "in accordance with the
thoroughness of its research and the persuasiveness of its
reasoning." 138 While the EEOC guidelines are helpful for
employers to avoid suits, they are in no way binding on the
courts, which are free to require more or less of employers in
showing a business necessity.
1ss Id.
134 Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Consideration of Arrest and
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (cited in note 87).
1s5 Id.
1s6 Id.
117
See Griggs, 401 US at 433-34.
"s

See SEPTA, 479 F3d at 244.
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The EEOC has recently filed suits against employers it
alleges used criminal background checks with a discriminatory
effect, signaling "increasing government scrutiny of criminal and
credit checks." 139 There is a potential conflict between the
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII and state statutes. The "vast
majority of states" provide no statutory protections for
applicants with criminal records, and employers in these states
"may be subject to statutes requiring criminal background
checks for certain positions." 140 As a result, employers may be
forced to choose to follow either the EEOC guidance for using
criminal background checks in order to avoid violating Title VII
or local laws requiring eliminating applicants with criminal
backgrounds. 141 Without clear guidance from the courts,
employers are left to make such decisions even if their policy
may not violate Title VII. Given that the EEOC has recently
begun to pursue criminal background check policies of
employers, any additional certainty would benefit both the
employers as well as the courts.
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE GREEN FACTORS

The Third and the Eighth Circuit have struggled to apply
the business necessity defense to employer policies based on
criminal history. Both courts have created different, yet similar,
means by which an employer may assert business necessity.
This Part argues that courts should adopt the three-factor test
proposed in Green and endorsed in the EEOC guidance because
it more closely represents the business necessity outlined in
Supreme Court decisions and through the intent of Congress
than does the risk analysis proposed in SEPTA.
A.

Supreme Court's Heavy Burden on Employers for
Validation

First, it is important to address whether criminal history
policies should be justified by business necessity at all. The
19
Scott Thurm, Employment Checks Fuel Race Complaints (The Wall Street
Journal June 11, 2013), online at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127
887323495604578539283518855020 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
140 Timothy M. Cary, A Checkered Past: When Title
VII Collides with State Statutes

MandatingCriminalBackground Checks, 28 ABA J Labor & Empl L 499, 510 (2013).
141 See Waldon, 941 F Supp 2d at 890 (noting that Title
VII "trumps state mandates"
that require the exclusion of applicants with criminal backgrounds).
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Supreme Court decisions do not on their face provide a means
for criminal history policies to be justified by business necessity.
In Albemarle, the court noted that the EEOC Guidelines and
Griggs indicate that "discriminatory tests are impermissible
unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements
of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job ...
for which candidates are being evaluated." 14 2 It follows that for a
criminal background check policy with a disparate impact on a
protected group to be permissible, an employer must be able to
show using professionally acceptable methods that the test does
measure a relevant work behavior. The burden is also rather
high, as the test must be predictive of or significantly correlated
to the desired behavior. This standard would mean an employer
could not disqualify applicants for criminal backgrounds without
some proof the policy was created using professional acceptable
methods and that the policy does actually predict or correlate to
the behavior. Given the tremendous difficulty in predicting
future criminal activity, especially criminal conduct in the
workplace, 143 employers would likely struggle to meet their
burden of showing business necessity. Following precedent, the
burden for employers to show business necessity is not
necessarily easy and cannot merely be a common-sense based
assertion.
Rather, the courts in Green and SEPTA created their own
rules to analyze the policy instead of simply rejecting the
employer's justification outright. In SEPTA, the court openly
suggests that the business necessity defense outlined in noncriminal background cases does not fit criminal background
cases easily.1 44 The standards in place in non-criminal
background cases require a policy to relate to job performance to
fulfill the business necessity requirement, and the language for

Albemarle, 422 US at 431 (citations omitted).
See Stacy A. Hickox and Mark V. Roehling, Negative Credentials: Fair and
Effective Considerationof Criminal Records, 50 Am Bus L J 201, 208 (2013) (noting that
"the limited available empirical evidence fails to support the assumption, made by some
employers, that all criminal record information is useful in predicting workplace
misbehavior").
144 SEPTA, 479 F3d at 242-43 (explaining that "the hiring policies at issue [in
Griggs and its progeny] were tests designed or used-at least allegedly-to measure an
employee's ability to perform the relevant jobs. Here, however, the hiring policy has
nothing to do with the applicant's ability to [perform the job]").
142
143
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business necessity "is worded to address ability, not risk." 145
However, the standard created by the Supreme Court for
business necessity "never defined [the defense] so narrowly that
it is impossible for employers to meet."14 6 Perhaps this explains
why courts have been reluctant to say that criminal history is
not related to business necessity in any capacity.
The court in SEPTA did not directly rely on Supreme Court
precedent. The SEPTA court's reliance on a risk analysis
constituted a rather large departure from other disparate
impact cases, criminal history or not. The employer would not
need to show that there is a heightened level of risk and instead
could simply show there is no reliable way to determine such
risk.147 Furthermore, under the reasoning from SEPTA, a
bright-line policy banning all violent offenders could be justified
by business necessity. 148 This would be if other factors such as
age of conviction, the number of convictions, and time since the
conviction fail to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 14 9 For
example, although SEPTA's policy did not take the time since
the conviction for some offenses into consideration before
rejecting applicants, it remained permissible according to the
court's decision. 150
The court's reasoning in SEPTA departs from what courts
have required from employers in non-criminal history cases. The
Supreme Court has required an employer to meet the burden of
showing that an employment requirement has a manifest
relationship to the employment in question. 1 1 The equivalent
for a testing requirement, for example, would be to simply allow
the employer to show they cannot prove reliably that individuals
who did worse on the test could do the job adequately. The Court
interpreted Congress's command from Title VII to mean that
such policies are "forbidden ...

unless they are demonstrably a

reasonable measure of job performance,"

152

and not that a policy

Id at 243.
Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1530-31 (cited in note 48).
147 SEPTA, 479 F3d at 247 (dismissing evidence from
the plaintiff that raised
questions about SEPTA's care in forming its hiring policies).
148 Id at 246 (noting that "SEPTA may be able to show that a policy excluding all
violent offenders is justified by business necessity").
149
Id.
141
146

"s

Id at 243-44.
... See Albemarle, 422 US at 425.
112 Griggs, 401 US
at 436.
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is justified if it cannot reliably show that those who do worse can
do the job adequately.
B.

Legislative History Demands a Higher Burden on
Employers

Congress codified the business necessity defense in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 in response to recent Supreme Court
decisions that lightened the burden on employers. 1 53 The Act
explicitly states that Congress created it in response to the
decision in Wards Cove, which "weakened the scope and
effectiveness" of civil rights protections.1 5 4 In doing so, Congress
ensured that employers have an affirmative burden to prove a
practice is consistent with business necessity. Importantly, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 singles out the Wards Cove decision, but
does not override the decision in Green made years prior.
The risk analysis approach from SEPTA would lessen the
burden on employers as they would only need to show one factor
instead of three like in Green. While Congressional discussion
regarding business necessity is limited, Congress' purpose was
clearly to reverse the trend towards an easier path for employers
as evidenced by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As
such, Congressional actions mark a movement towards a more
rigorous standard for business necessity than that in Wards

Cove.
C.

Uncertainty Regarding Risk

At first glance, considering the level of risk of hiring
applicants seems similar to the Green factors. A court that
adopts a risk-analysis approach would likely still consider the
three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense or
conduct; (2) the time that has passed since the offense, conduct,
and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) the nature of the job
held or sought. 155 This would not be required, however, and so a

..
s Hodge, Legislative Response, 22 Cumb L Rev at 818 (cited in note 64) (mentioning
the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act prevent employers from defending a hiring
policy based only on an employer's business goals and instead put the burden on the
employer to affirmatively prove the practice is job related).
114 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified at 42 USC
§ 1981.
. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Consideration of Arrest and

Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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court could choose to look at none of these factors, or to look at
more factors, as long as they fall within the umbrella term
"risk."
One can find the Green factors in SEPTA. Using the facts
from SEPTA, the Third Circuit held the policy that removed an
employee who had gone decades without another conviction for a
violent offense was consistent with business necessity. The
original offense was of great gravity, but a considerable amount
of time had passed from the offense. Under SEPTA, a policy may
be justified by just one of the Green factors without
consideration to the others necessarily.
A rule based on risk provides insufficient notice to
employers about what could constitute a successful business
necessity defense. Because the Green factors are clearly
outlined, a business knows what it should consider when
forming a hiring policy. Under a risk-analysis, a business is left
to determine its own acceptable level of risk, what factors it
believes lead to risk, and how to analyze applicants for risk.
There is, however, a strong counterargument. Although
adopting Green would outline three factors, a business is still
unsure at what level or combination of factors will create a
proper business necessity defense. Even identical convictions
can carry different sentences that an employer might weigh
differently. An employer, for example, may make a hiring policy
that rejects applicants with convictions within a certain amount
of years. That employer would be unsure if that number of years
is too broad for the policy to be defensible by business necessity.
In analyzing the time since a conviction, courts need more
specific guidance as to what lengths should be acceptable. One
suggestion is to create default time limits based on information
from studies on the decreasing relevance of convictions for
predicting behavior in the future as well as recidivism rates.15 6
For example, research has led some experts to recommend that
criminal records more than seven years old should not be used
in hiring because there is "no enhanced propensity to engage in
criminal behavior in the future." 15 7 This would essentially act as

1964 (cited in note 87).
116 See Hickox and Roehling, 50 Am Bus L J at 272-73 (cited in
note 143) (noting
that there are temporal limitations established by the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule
609 as to the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness's character).
117 Id at
246.
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a reverse bright-line rule. Whereas a bright-line rule that
excludes employees within a certain time since a conviction may
violate Title VII, an acting standard that employers cannot
consider criminal behavior of a certain age would work to
include more applicants.
D.

Bright-line Policies Require an Individualized Approach

Bright-line hiring policies potentially signal that the policy
is not sufficiently tailored to be justified by business necessity.
The court in SEPTA permitted bright-line policies as acceptable
under business necessity if they distinguish between applicants
that do and do not pose an unacceptable level of risk. 15 8 In
Green, the court rejected an employer rule that denied all
applicants with more than a minor traffic violation, as it was too
broad to be justified by business necessity. 15 9 While these court
decisions are not necessarily at odds with one another, the
SEPTA court appeared more willing to entertain the possibility
of bright-line rules that are able to actually distinguish
applicants, whereas the Green court does not consider the
legality of a more tailored bright-line policy.
Courts should require that employers who use bright-line
policies adopt the individualized approach suggested by the
EEOC guidelines. 160 An employer practice that tailors its
bright-line policies in line with the Green factors would likely, as
suggested by the EEOC, pass muster from courts taking either
the Green or SEPTA approach alike. This is because, although
Title VII does not require an individualized assessment, an
employer practice of "targeted exclusion,"-meaning the policy
"exclude[s] individuals from particular positions for specified
criminal conduct within a defined time period"-would be able to
identify the criminal history with a "tight nexus to the position
in question." 16 1 In doing so, an employer would not be able to
reject any applicants with any criminal history at all. Instead, it
would need to be certain criminal history from a certain time
ago that is connected with the specific job for which the
"s SEPTA, 479 F3d at 245.
19
Green, 523 F2d at 1298.
160 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Consideration of Arrest and
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (cited in note 87).
1
Id.
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individual applies. Although not perfectly individualized, an
approach that takes into account the Green factors would allow
businesses to use some form of bright-line rule in rejecting
applicants. This could be especially helpful for businesses that
receive many applicants or where the nature of the job requires
a higher level of "targeted exclusion" of those with criminal
backgrounds and so rejecting those applicants might be more
easily done. This would bridge the small gap between Green and
SEPTA regarding bright-lines, while maintaining that the
employer policy takes more factors into account.
E.

Prohibition of a "Less is Better" Approach

Non-criminal disparate impact cases prohibit employers
from using a "more is better" approach with their policies, and
instead all applicants that meet a certain threshold requirement
should be considered for employment. Courts can adopt policies
from non-criminal disparate impact case law to criminal
background check cases by prohibiting employers from choosing
applicants with less of a criminal background than others once
an acceptable risk level has been met. This possibility seems
controversial as an employer would likely choose the applicant
with no criminal history over another with any criminal history
given everything else is equal between the two individuals. But
this is what the law requires. In Griggs, the Court required that
a policy measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract in order to be justified by business necessity. 162 The
court in SEPTA similarly rejected the "abstract notion that more
of a given quality is better." 163 It follows then that if a business
policy permitted a certain level of risk, for example, then the
business would not be justified by business necessity to choose
applicants based on who has a less extensive criminal history.
This would not be much different than, for example, a fire
department choosing the tallest and fastest applicants, where
successful performance only requires a certain minimum height
and speed. Such a policy would likely result in the hiring of far
more men than women, and this disparate impact would not be
justified by business necessity as the job does not actually need
the tallest and fastest applicants.
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Employers may struggle to find a minimum qualification
standard for criminal history. While test scores or physical
requirements give some indication of minimal job performance,
"it is hard to articulate the minimum qualification for posing a
low risk of attacking someone." 164 If one were to adopt that there
is no minimum qualification though, then that could perhaps be
used to exclude all applicants with any criminal history.
Although a minimum qualification for posing a low risk may be
hard to articulate, once that threshold is met by an applicant,
the applicant's criminal history should not be used against them
by an employer policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the Green three-factor test, as it better
encapsulates the direction of non-criminal disparate impact
court decisions and asks more of employers using the business
necessity defense. While many courts have addressed business
necessity regarding disparate impact claims, only two appellate
courts have considered the business necessity of using criminal
history in hiring decisions. The two courts have taken different
approaches. In Green, the court used a three-factor test,
considering the nature and gravity of the offense, the time that
has passed since the offense, and the nature of the job held or
sought. 165 The court in SEPTA, on the other hand, analyzed
business necessity by determining if an employer's policies
successfully screen applicants who present an unacceptable
risk.166 Although the two approaches are different, their results
are most likely similar, and the reasoning is reconcilable. Both
courts will allow certain bright-line policies as long as they seem
tailored. The best way to address the approaches of both courts
would be to allow bright-line rules that are tailored using the

Green factors. In doing so, a policy that fulfills the Green factors
will also have fulfilled the SEPTA analysis for risk. Such an
approach would also incorporate the EEOC's preference for a
more individualized approach, as well as the Congress' aims
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to increase the burden on
employers regarding business necessity. Furthermore, it would
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help conform criminal background disparate impact decisions
with Supreme Court precedent, which has favored empirical
proof over bare or common-sense assertions. The business
necessity defense demands a lot from employers, and courts
should require no less of employers defending a criminal
background check policy.

